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Abstract 
The paper conceptualizes the societal impacts of disinformation in hopes of developing a  computational 
approach that can identify disinformation in order to strengthen social resilience. An innovative 
approach that considers the sociotechnical interaction phenomena of social media is  utilized to address 
and combat disinformation campaigns. Based on theoretical inquiries, this study proposes conducting 
experiments that capture subjective and objective measures and datasets while adopting machine 
learning to model how disinformation can be identified computationally. The study particularly will focus 
on understanding communicative social actions as human intelligence when developing machine 
intelligence to learn about disinformation that is deliberately misleading, as well as the ways people 
judge the credibility and truthfulness of information. Previous experiments support the viability of a 
sociotechnical approach, i.e., connecting subtle language-action cues and linguistic features from human 
communication with hidden intentions, thus leading to deception detection in online communication. The 
study intends to derive a baseline dataset and a predictive model and by that to create an information 
system artefact with the capability to differentiate disinformation. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Disinformation and false information, casually referred to as fake news, has a tendency 
to radicalize American politics (Benkler et al. 2018) and polarize communities around 
the world (Bodrunova et al. 2019). Political parties regularly utilize false information, 
or disinformation, to disrupt society. Oxford Internet Institute (2019) reports that an 
increasing number of countries—70 in 2019 (up from 
48 in 2018, and 28 in 2017)—have experienced coordinated social-media 
disinformation campaigns. China has become one of the major countries to experience 
“global disinformation disorder.” Until the Hong Kong protests1 in 2019 (Haas 2019), 
Chinese propaganda was mostly confined to domestic platforms like Weibo and 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Hong Kong protest: https://www.technologyreview.com/s/614286/the-new-battle-in-hong-kong-isnt-on-the- 
streets-its-in-the-apps 
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WeChat. However, many Chinese have since expanded their social connections using 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube2 (MIT Technology Review 2019). 
As disinformation campaigns grow, the interests and stability of the masses and 
society are minimized by the preferences and biases of both individuals and 
corporations. The creation of the societal conflicts through disinformation campaigns 
can be viewed as “information warfare;” a new form of cyber-attack. Information 
warfare is on display when military officials were trained by Russian intelligence 
operatives in Myanmar3 to manipulate public opinion using social media (New York 
Times 2018). Similarly, cyber troops from Sri Lanka were trained in India, and 
employees from the Ethiopian government were trained in China to spread propaganda 
to the masses4 (New York Times 2019). The targets of these efforts include disruption 
of the social fabric, and a sabotaging of civil consciousness. This new type of organized 
social persuasion—disinformation campaigns—is very different from media bias; a 
well-studied communication issue. 
The Media Bias Ratings system5 is well accepted in media literacy studies. 
However, there is not enough attention given to the accuracy of media sources’, which 
is a major aspect of the bias ratings. Although the International Fact-Checking Network6 
(IFCN) established a code of principles for fact-checking, the Media Bias/Fact Check7 
(MBFC) continues to experience challenges in differentiating political opinions/biases 
from factual accuracy based on the fact-checkers’ code (e.g., Is the news source reported 
factually? Does the news provide evidence for its claims?). 
Some fact-checking initiatives have gained publicity. For  instance, Lithuanians 
developed a software app to combat Russian propaganda (The Economist 2019), and 
mainstream news outlets have started automating their moderation of comments. The 
Economist and the New York Times have considered and applied 
 
 
2 YouTube removed posts about the Hong Kong protests: https://www.technologyreview.com/f/614217/youtube- 
has-removed-210-channels-that-posted-about-the-hong-kong-protests/ 
3 New York Times (2018) A Genocide Incited on Facebook, With Posts From Myanmar’s Military: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html 
4 New York Times (2019) At least 70 countries have had disinformation campaigns: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/26/technology/government-disinformation-cyber-troops.html 
5 AllSides ratings of bias in electronic media: https://www.kaggle.com/supratimhaldar/allsidescom-media-bias- 
ratings 
6 IFCN Fact-Checking: https://ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/know-more/the-code-and-the-platforms 
7 Media Bias/Face Check (MBFC): https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/methodology 
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Google’s Perspective8. The German outlet Die Welt has developed a "Comment 
Moderation" tool (Sterzing et al. 2017). Regardless of the above efforts, unchecked 
reliance on the news media has also become problematic. As Starbird et al. (2018) 
pointed out, the current multi-layered news media ecosystem that echoes the news by 
pushing it out to diverse sites has amplified the problem of re-broadcasting and 
spreading mis- and (dis-)information. 
We thus ask this question: How do we model machine intelligence based on 
human intelligence to learn about disinformation in order to strengthen social 
resilience? In this developmental paper, we attempt to conceptualize the tactical 
impacts of disinformation so we can identify it using human intelligence. Our future 
study will include conducting social-psychological experiments that collect data in 
scenario-based situations, based on human intelligence/judgment of disinformation, 
when buried in “ordinary” (i.e., not criminal or distinctively suspicious) 
communication. 
2.0 Theoretical Concepts 
Disinformation is not a new phenomenon, but an age-old form of warfare, or a strategy 
utilized by an ill-intentioned opponent to destabilize a society. For example, this 
strategy was utilized by Mao Tse-Tung to divide China after World War II (Jones 2018; 
Katzenbach Jr. and Hanrahan 1955). But the problem of disinformation has been 
amplified in the 21st century as a result of high speed and connectivity on the Internet, 
where distorted information can be spread instantly across the world, making it nearly 
impossible to propagate the truth or a retraction (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017; Tendoc 
Jr. et al. 2017). 
Given this era of social media and the unlimited web, disinformation now 
spreads faster than ever to larger groups of people. Disinformation has become an 
alarming phenomenon. Understanding how it is dispersed in social media—and 
devising mechanisms to stop it—is of the utmost importance (Conroy et al. 2015; Shu 
et al. 2017). 
2.1 Definition of Disinformation 
Over the course of years, researchers have deliberated as to what constitutes 
disinformation. Although there is no unanimous agreement on the definition, studies 
have converged at similar conclusions. Hernon (1995) differentiated between 
 
8 Google’s Perspective: https://www.perspectiveapi.com/#/home 
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disinformation from misinformation by a measure of intent. Disinformation refers to 
inaccurate information as a result of “a deliberate attempt to deceive or mislead, 
whereas misinformation is defined as the result of an honest mistake (p. 134). Fetzer 
(2004a) described disinformation as “misinformation with an attitude” (p. 231), and 
highlighted how fallacious and incomplete information is disseminated in an 
intentional, deliberate, purposeful effort to mislead, deceive or confuse (Fetzer 2004b, 
p. 228). Fallis’ (2009; 2015) conceptual analysis model considers disinformation as 
being tantamount to deceptive lying. 
The primary goal of developing and disseminating disinformation is to  confuse 
or deceive people (Fetzer 2004b, p. 228). However, it is worth noting that premeditated 
lies are different than simply mistaken or misleading information. When these criteria 
exist without the motive of duping people, they are considered misinformation (Fetzer 
2004a; Hernon 1995). When known to be false with the intention of misleading and/or 
deceiving, these assertions also qualify to be called “lies” (Fetzer 2004b, p. 232). A 
fundamental component of disinformation remains that it is intended to deceive and 
confuse for some sort of gain (Fetzer 2004a), thus giving it the element of ulterior 
motive (Fetzer 2004b). 
2.2 Issues of Disinformation in Social Media 
Social media has significantly changed people’s information behaviour with regards to 
production, sharing, and fruition of content (Chen et al. 2015). Mocanu et al. (2015) 
identified that people who tend to interact with conspiracy sources are likely to 
intentionally spread false claims. Social media has gained popularity and priority in 
propagating policies (Hernon 1995) in students’ sharing of information (Chen et al. 
2015), and in many political campaigns (Garrett 2017). In social media, individuals tend 
to endorse and affirm information they agree with (Pennycook et al. 2018; Stewart et 
al. 2018). Terms such as “echo chamber” or “filter bubble” have been used to describe 
such phenomena on social media (Garrett 2017), and this leads to a greater societal 
threat (Lewandowsky et al. 2013) such as when fake news impacted the 2016 US 
election. 
With the global pervasiveness of social media, fake news circulates more readily 
and reaches more people (Garrett 2017), and tends to foster a collective credulity 
because of its pervasiveness (Mocanu et al. 2015). There is a real threat to our 
understanding of reality as a result of the unprecedented proliferation of 
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conspiracy-related content (Mocanu et al. 2015). The social resources available for 
fighting disinformation is finite, while its proliferation is accelerating (Garrett 2017). 
2.3 Detecting Disinformation through Understanding of Communicative Actions 
Old rumours are often repackaged into news, and re-tweeted by influential 
Twitter users so as to gain additional visibility. To detect rumours and disinformation, 
many computational approaches—such as natural language processing techniques and 
linguistic analysis—have been employed. Galitsky’s (2015) adopted web mining at the 
sentence level—where each sentence is compared to an original text that is available, 
while also calculating the syntactic similarity. Shin et al. (2018) studied message 
sources and temporal patterns regarding how rumours resurface through partisan news 
websites. However, existing research into disinformation lacks a perspective on 
information credibility (Hilligoss and Rieh 2008; Jensen et al. 2010; Rieh 2014), quality 
(Rieh 2002; Rieh and Danielson 2007) and understanding of the communicative intent 
and action. It is critical to develop a keen understanding of the human intelligence to 
the extent to which disinformation is deliberately misleading (Fallis 2009), as well as 
the ways people judge the credibility and truthfulness of information (Pennycook et al. 
2018; Pew Research Center 2019). Moreover, based on the understanding of social 
norms and cultural values, we can then afford machines a way to learn about the 
dissemination process of coordinated disinformation (Lazer et al. 2018). 
Mutual understanding and relationships are the foundations of communicative 
action (Haberman and McCarthy 1984; Haberman and McCarthy 1987). As 
communication is dominated by social norms and cultural values (Te'eni 2001), diverse 
values and attitudes held by different social actors may be used to distort 
communicative action. If social actors care only that “the end justifies the means,” such 
belief not only endangers a society with no symmetry in the ability to trust one another, 
but further puts the society at risk with false claims from those with hidden (unknown) 
intentions and agenda. Habermas (1998) urged that different mechanisms should be 
investigated and incorporated for interpretation and any corresponding actions so 
society can be brought together with truthfulness and trustfulness. 
3.0 Research Methods 
We propose to conduct a social-psychological experiment that incorporates 
mechanisms to capture users’ intent and decisions when facing factual accounts vs. 
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fake news. The result will further development of an inference engine—based on the 
collected data—that can differentiate between objective reporting and disinformation, 
to computationally provide “tells” that can identify computer-mediated deception in 
online communication. The proposed research will analyze different sources and types 
of evaluation for deceptive vs. non-deceptive online actors. 
Participants will be recruited and consent to enter a scenario-based 3-phase 
study. In phase 1, personality, attitudes and self-importance constructs will be designed 
into both before- and after- surveys. Motivation and perspectives on particular messages 
will be included. This short survey will also capture the dependent outcome variables. 
In phase 2, a mechanism to trace each distributed message and count the number of 
times that similar messages have been forwarded, shared, liked or disliked, etc. will be 
incorporated. In phase 3, we will systemically collect participants’ longitudinal reaction 
and interactions with friends via their posts and comments on the system. 
Conversational linguistic data will then be collected for computational analysis 
(machine learning) and statistical analyses (such as multilevel modeling). 
4.0 Conclusion and Contributions 
The proposed work is expected to contribute to the computational detection of 
disinformation—based on speech patterns and linguistic features—in social networks 
and online communities. Understanding user perceptions of communication patterns 
and the ability to differentiate types of information (misinformation vs. disinformation) 
are not simple questions because they involve not only human judgment and perception 
of truth, but also individual attitudes and social norms, being trusting or suspicious in 
the communicative action—whether dogmatic or authentic. Based on the sociotechnical 
system study, social actors’ judgment and communicative action will determine the 
ability to differentiate between factual information and disinformation. Defining actors’ 
characteristics and modelling the detection of disinformation computationally will 
provide a novel approach to combat disinformation. 
The proposed study will derive a baseline dataset and a computational model 
for predictive research to continue (Ho et al. 2020a; Ho et al. 2020b). This study 
connects subtle language-action cues and linguistic features from human 
communication to create an information system artefact (Ho et al. 2015a; Ho and 
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Hancock 2018; Ho and Hancock 2019; Ho et al. 2017; Ho et al. 2016a; Ho et al. 2016b; 
Ho et al. 2016c; Ho et al. 2015b; Ho et al. 2016d; Ho et al. 2014). It will serve as a 
precursor to building a sociotechnical schema. This study will help society to 
understand and enable trustworthy communication and collaborative information 
behaviour across social media, as well as our personalized cyber worlds. 
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